Special Forces was created to be a force multiplier. An A team is capable of recruiting, arming, training and advising a guerrilla force of several hundred. With a minimum expenditure of money, munitions, and especially U. S. troops, sizable military units can be formed. The expectation during the cold war years was that this activity would take place during a conventional land war. These guerilla units would disrupt the enemy’s rear areas. The other aspect of the Special Forces mission was to help legally formed governments to resist guerrilla movements that were intent on overthrowing it. This second aspect of this force multiplier capability was the major thrust of the Special Forces mission in Viet Nam. Special Forces A teams were assigned to advise VNSF teams in leading CIDG troops. These troops were local civilians who were recruited, trained and armed to conduct combat missions in the local area. They established A camps to combat Viet Cong forces and restrict the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and materiel.
The normal practice is for SF teams to be targeted against specific geographic areas of the world. Over long periods of time the teams study the language, political structure and culture of their target area. That training prepares them to be effective in their target area from day one. Due to the rapid buildup of forces in Viet Nam, there were not sufficient Special Forces officers and men trained in the usual manner to operate in Viet Nam. Consequently, most of the Special Forces personnel assigned to Viet Nam had not had training in the Vietnamese language, political makeup or the culture, or more accurately, the several sub-cultures.
Some of the VNSF teams in the A camps were extremely aggressive and competent, but some were quite passive, even passive-aggressive. This led to occasional friction between highly motivated U. S. Special Forces and their Vietnamese counterparts. While I was assigned to Dak Pek the Vietnamese team there was inclined to be passive. They spent more time and energy trying to figure out ways to rip us off than they did planning and executing combat operations.
On the other hand, my SF troops and I wanted to make our one year tour count for something. We aggressively planned and conducted patrols looking for ways to find, rather than avoid, the enemy. We did our best to follow good procedures so that we would find the enemy instead of having him find us.
One case in point occurred when two NCOs accompanied a patrol comprised of about 30 strikers and two VNSF NCOs. In moving to their objective area they traveled through some very rough thickets of bamboo, only occasionally crossing a trail. After two or three days of that kind of movement, everyone was fatigued. When they got ready to return to camp, the VNSF wanted to retrace their route to save the effort of traveling through virgin territory. One of the first lessons anyone learned in Viet Nam was not to return by the same route as you went out--that just begged for an ambush. My two guys disagreed with the VNSF, who insisted they follow their back trail. Seeing that they could not change the VNSF’s minds, my guys announced that if they returned on the same route, the two U. S. guys would return alone by another route. This infuriated the VNSF, who at that point capitulated.
On the first day of the return trip, the ‘Yards came to my two NCOs and told that the two VNSF were planning to stage a mock fire fight, during which they planned to shoot the SF. The ‘Yards reported that when they overheard the plot, they told the VNSF that if they did so, the ‘Yards would then kill the VNSF. During the remainder of the patrol the SF were especially alert to the actions of the VNSF, but the ‘Yards’ threat apparently had discouraged the plot.
A second touchy situation developed when one of my team caught a Vietnamese striker in the act of stealing supplies from the supply room. In a less isolated location, petty theft would not have been such a serious offense. In Dak Pek, however, every thing came in by air. It was difficult to replace lost supplies, and if we came under attack, we needed to know exactly what we had on hand and exactly where it was. And since our storage space was limited, we could not stockpile large amounts of supplies. Consequently, we were very sensitive to the theft of what little we did have.
When my man caught the thief red handed, he beat the crap out of him. It just so happened that there was a Caribou warming up on the airstrip near the supply room. My guy dragged the thief out to the Caribou and threw him aboard just as the crew chief closed the ramp. Within seconds, the thief was in route to wherever that Caribou was headed.
Let me say that I didn’t know what was happening. Had I known, I would not have allowed the thief to be assaulted, but would have demanded that the VNSF commander dismiss the man and get him out of Dak Pek.
My first indication that something was amiss was when three fully armed Vietnamese strikers showed up in our team house. They came over to me with weapons at the ready. When I asked what they wanted they did not reply. I looked around to find that every other American in camp had his own entourage of armed guards. It was not long before I learned what had happened. I tried to contact the VNSF CO, but couldn’t find him. I suspected that he had ordered the guards to be placed on us, then made himself scarce. I was fully convinced that one mistake now would start a shooting spree, and we were to be the targets. It scared the hell out of me, but I tried not to let it show. Face is a big thing to the Vietnamese, and having a Vietnamese assaulted and deported insulted them. If it had been a ‘Yard, they would have laughed at the incident.
I went to the commo bunker and called the B team commander, my guards tagging along. When I explained what had happened and asked for his guidance, he told me not to bother him, but to handle it myself. Luckily, the situation handled itself. When the ‘Yards saw the Americans being held at gun point by the Vietnamese, they grabbed their weapons and put three guards on each Vietnamese guard. They made it plain to the Vietnamese that any action against us would result in their immediate demise. Since we had about 700 ‘Yards in camp and only about 50 or so Vietnamese, it took the guards only a few moments to calculate the odds and fade away.
Once tempers had cooled, I had an eyeball to eyeball talk with the man who had assaulted the striker. I received an assurance that no further incidences like that would occur. When I finally located the VNSF CO, he was angry and non-communicative. We finally restored the usual relationship, which wasn’t all that good anyway.
I later learned why the B team CO was unresponsive to my predicament. He had undergone a minor surgical procedure early that morning. While he was being sewn up, he was called away to another A camp where the strikers were in mutiny. My call came in just as he returned to his headquarters with his incision bleeding heavily. I guess he figured that a mere crisis did not measure up to the full blown mutiny he had just attended.
Copyright 1999
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