Stories about war experiences are often replete with plenty of shooting, injured and dying people. My stories mostly tell about things that happened when bullets were not flying. There are some funny things, some merely informative. I hope they will entertain you.
There are a lot of terms and abbreviations in these stories that those who experienced Viet Nam will understand. Those who may not have had that opportunity will need a bit of help, so I include a glossary for their use.
My time in Viet Nam was spent in the company of tremendously talented, mature and courageous SF soldiers. In those days soldiers could not get into SF unless they were experienced officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who had already been in the Army several years. One sign of the maturity of SF troops was that I never saw or heard of any of them becoming involved with illegal drugs.
First let me explain the organization of the 5th Special Forces Group as it existed in Viet Nam. An A Team was the smallest unit in SF, consisting of a CO (Capt), an XO (Lt), and 10 NCOs—a team sergeant, an intelligence sergeant, two weapons specialists, two engineer specialists, two communications specialists and two medics. One step up the organizational ladder was the B team. The B team exercised command and control over a variable number of A teams. Next was the C team, one for each of the four Corps Tactical Zones. C teams provided the same functions for several B teams. Finally, the four C teams reported to the 5th SF Group headquarters at Nha Trang. Most, if not all, of the supplies requested by teams were shipped directly from 5th Group to the team.
I spent two one-year tours with SF in Viet Nam. The first one was from November 1965-November 1966. The first six months was spent as the commanding officer of SF A Team 242 based at the small remote camp at Dak Pek. Dak Pek was the northernmost camp in the II Corps Tactical Zone. It was located adjacent to the tri-border area where the international boundaries of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos meet. The mission of the camp and others like it was to patrol aggressively to identify routes used by North Vietnamese soldiers infiltrating into South Viet Nam, and to engage and destroy those troops if possible. In instances where the lightly armed indigenous troops met superior forces, reaction forces of native troops or U. S. units were committed.
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| Dak Pek 1966, ready for combat operation |
A teams nominally served as advisors to Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) teams in the camps. When the VNSF team was aggressive in pursuing the mission, things went reasonably well. When the VNSF was more passive, the American SF troops had a more difficult time prosecuting the war.
My second tour was with Studies and Observations Group (SOG), June 1968-June1969. The part of SOG with which I served conducted classified cross-the-border reconnaissance missions into Laos and Cambodia, avoiding detection and engagement if they could. Occasionally larger forces were committed to engage in active combat operations. SOG headquarters in Saigon exercised command and control over three operational units—Command and Control North (CCN), Central (CCC in Kontum Province, where I served), and South (CCS). SOG missions with which I was acquainted were led by SF soldiers, rather than them being advisors. There were many other parts of SOG which were highly classified and known only to those with a need to know.
The stories that follow recount things I experienced or that I am persuaded by trusted sources that they happened substantially as I describe them. I hope they give you a perspective on that conflict to which you may not have had exposure.
Sam Sanford
LTC (ret)
U. S. Army Special Forces
Copyright 1999
Copyright 1999
